junio 10, 2008

CUBA allows 'change' only to hold on to power
Posted on Tue, Jun. 10, 2008

 By CHRIS SIMMONS
 
 The  Directorate of Counterintelligence (DCI), Cuba's  domestic security  force, is the most patient of Havana's intelligence services.
 Historically, this patience has been a decisive factor in its success.
 However, success has become a double-edged sword. Its use of the same  operational tactics, techniques and procedures has made it predictable.
 Having avoided major intelligence failures that could be used to reassess  how  it does business, the DCI has become operationally complacent and  unimaginative. Despite this weakness, it remains highly effective at  targeting those it views as threats to regime stability.
 
 One of these perceived threats is _Cambio_  (Change), a campaign by  dissidents to bring democracy to Cuba. Based on the DCI's predictability,  its course of action against _Cambio _will probably be as follows:  It will  continue to allow _Cambio's_  growth and development. It will secretly monitor the effort but do nothing  to cripple its spread. While this may seem counterintuitive, it must take  this approach so that it can fully  identify the potential threat and all  key participants. To attack _Cambio_  too soon would push the campaign underground, leaving it intact and harder  to find.
 
 The DCI has undoubtedly initiated a two-pronged attack. Its efforts would have begun with traditional infiltration techniques: DCI officers and  agents  infiltrated into the cadre of _Cambio_  supporters. The DCI would further expand this baseline by co-opting _Cambio _supporters arrested by the security and law enforcement services. It rewards the co-optees with early release in exchange for their future services.
 
 INSIDERS BECOME INFORMANTS
 
 Concurrently, the DCI coordinates with police and security forces to maintain moderate pressure on _Cambio_.  This maintains the perception that _Cambio_ attracts government attention and a level of harassment consistent with the other dissident movements. It also allows more opportunities to turn _Cambio _members into informants.
 
 As years pass, the DCI will continue to infiltrate agents and officers, some of whom will become such trusted insiders that they eventually secure leadership positions.
 
 During this period, Havana will continue to ''tolerate'' _Cambio's_ existence and enjoy the favorable media coverage that results. Then, at the moment most politically advantageous to the regime, the government will move in and cripple it by detaining all its senior and mid-level leadership. Historically, such acts are timed to divert attention from a massive government failure or to seize a political opening in which it can avoid significant international repercussions.
 
 During the crackdown, many DCI personnel who infiltrated the campaign will be ‘‘detained’’ along with legitimate _Cambio_ members. This ensures the safety of its personnel and creates an opportunity for intelligence collection in the most unlikely of places -- a Cuban jail. Then, having crippled the movement, the DCI will reveal the identity of many of its penetration agents and officers, denounce _Cambio_ as a CIA operation and assist in the show trials.
 
 A small number of ''imprisoned dissidents'' will actually be DCI assets who successfully infiltrated _Cambio_.  These personnel will continue to live their false identities and serve out their jail term before being ‘‘forced’’ to emigrate to the United States or another country. They will then actively continue their intelligence careers by again infiltrating _Cambio_ (or perhaps another exile group).
 
 In this fashion, the DCI members have the greatest cover of all, since they appear to have gone to ''prison'' and were ''harassed'' by the Cuban government.
 
 The DCI will also leave stay-behind agents and officers in place within the lower levels of _Cambio_.  Having ''survived'' the crackdown, the stay-behinds will become more trusted and rise within the organization. So begins the second wave of infiltrations, which will progressively spread throughout the depth and breadth of the reborn _Cambio_, ever ready for the next crackdown.
 
 The patience, detailed planning and comprehensiveness of the DCI’s targeting process means that _Cambio_ is already doomed. The DCI's vast resources and ample time have certainly allowed it to thoroughly infiltrate the movement. For _Cambio_ or any other dissident movement to survive, it must review its security measures and remain vigilant to the intelligence threat arrayed against it.
 
 The DCI’s successes have made it predictable and proud. The question is, can _Cambio_ exploit these two major operational weaknesses?
 
Chris Simmons is a career counterintelligence officer and an expert on Cuban intelligence.
 
 
Fuente: Miami Herald (www.miamiherald.com)
Link: http://www.miamiherald.com/news/americas/cuba/v-print/story/564416.html